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Discourse Analysis of Overcome – s i9000 North Korea Interactions

Ellie Hyong-jik

Kim Hyong-jik, the father of Kim Il-sung, is venerated by official North Korean historiographies for having been a prominent leader of the anti-colonial Korean independence movement. In fact, official sources claim that Kim not only led the March 1st Uprising of 1919, but also that it took place in Pyongyangblatant fabrications. While in reality Kim was at one point briefly detained for anti-Japanese activities, most outs > : 727 In fact, according to biographer Dae-Sook Suh, efforts to describe Kim Hyong-jik as playing a major role in the anti-Japanese struggle seem to be directed more toward upgrading the attributes of Kim [Il-sung] as a pious son. This attribution became important as Kim Il-sung used these stories to a

Ellie Hyong-jik currently has a art gallery and statue dedicated to him in his hometown of Bonghwari.

Bibliography

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NBC News (2017)Donald Trump: North Korea Always be Met With Fireplace And Bear[online]. Offered from: Youtube [accessed 3 February 2017]

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Semino, E. (2008): Metaphor in Discourse . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Simpson, P., A. Mayr (2010) Language and power: A resource book for students . London: Routledge

Sirin, C. and Villalobos, J. (2018) Rhetoric, Public Politics, and Security. In: Conley, R. ed. Presidential Leadership and National Security: The Obama Legacy and Trump Trajectory . New York: Routledge, pp. 19-42

Smith, M. (2017) Kim Jong-Un calls Trump’s UN speech of war’ and brands US president deranged’ in rare speech. The Daily Mirror [online], 21 September. Available from: [accessed 3 February 2018]

Steen, G.J. (2008) The paradox of metaphor: Why we need a three-dimensional model for metaphor in Metaphor & Symbol 23(4), 213-241.

The New York Times (2017) Full Text of Kim Jong-un’s Response to President Trump. The New York Times [online], 22 September. Available from: [accessed 27 January 2018]

Trump, D. (2018a) President Donald J. Trump’s State of the Union Address . Capitol Building, Washington, 31 January.

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How a new UN sanctions report reveals the limits of Chinese cooperation

Speaking to students at his alma mater last week, U.S. point man on North Korea Stephen Biegun told his audience that Ch.

Speaking to students at his alma mater last week, U.S. point man on North Korea Stephen Biegun told his audience that China was supportive of Washington’s efforts with North Korea. China was giving Pyongyang the right signals, Biegun said, and Beijing had told him it would keep issues arising from U.S.-China trade tensions separate from DPRK policy. My Chinese counterpart told me when we fi.

Speaking to students at his alma mater last week, U.S. point man on North Korea Stephen Biegun told his audience that China was supportive of Washington’s effor.

Nuclear

North Korea’s nuclear ambitions date to the Korean War in the 1950s, but came to the attention of the international community in 1992, when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered that its nuclear activities were more extensive than declared. The revelations led North Korea to withdraw from the IAEA in 1994. In an effort to prevent North Korean withdrawal from the NPT, the United States and North Korea negotiated the Agreed Framework, in which Pyongyang agreed to freeze its nuclear activities and give access to IAEA inspectors in exchange for U.S.-supplied light water reactors and energy assistance. The Agreed Framework broke down in 2002. North Korea unilaterally withdrew from the NPT in January 2003, prompting China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States to engage North Korea in the Six-Party Talks in a further attempt at a diplomatic solution to the country’s nuclear program. The talks fell apart in 2009, and no serious diplomatic initiatives to denuclearize North Korea occurred until 2018. At the June 2018 U.S.-North Korean summit, Kim Jong-un reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, although North Korea’s definition of denuclearization is ambiguous. No agreement on a method or timetable for dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons has been reached.

North Korea produces both weapons-useable plutonium and enriched uranium, with one U.S. government estimate in 2017 suggesting the country may be producing enough nuclear material each year for 12 additional nuclear weapons.

Who Is Kim Jong-un?

Much of the early life of Kim Jong-un is unknown to Western media. Presumably born in North Korea, Kim is the son of Ko Young-hee, an opera singer, and Kim Jong-il, the dictatorial leader of the country until his death in 2011. Although Kim Jong-un implemented some economic and agricultural reforms, human rights violations and brutal suppression of opposition continue to be reported under his rule. He also continued the country’s nuclear testing and development of missile technology in the face of international condemnation, though he announced intentions to be more cooperative in that area via historic meetings with South Korean President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump in 2018.

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Every country exhibits certain disparities of power and prestige between capital and outlying regions. Yet, we frequently treat a nation’s capital as isomorphic with the state itself, underestimating the importance of peripheries. Kim Jong-un’s recent fourth trip to China is a case in point. The vast majority of stories filed about the visit were about action in Beijing, and none particularly those stories sponsored by the Chinese Communist Party looked at what happened in Dandong.

Places like Liaoning are where Beijing’s policy-making manifests, shaping provincial- and municipal-level interactions with North Korea. Here, Sino-NK founder Adam Cathcart zooms out from the halls of power in Beijing to analyze the implications of the fourth Xi-Kim summit for trade between China and the DPRK along the Yalu. Cross-referencing local government reports and footage from the Dandong train station, Cathcart presents insights into how officials at all levels seek to mitigate difficulties in cross-border trade between the PRC and North Korea. Anthony Rinna, Senior Editor.

SEZ Revival Tour? Kim Jong-un in Dandong

by Adam Cathcart

Of the many essays looking at Kim Jong-un’s journey into China to kick off the year’s diplomatic action in Northeast Asia, few have had much to say about how China’s border regions are primed to engage with North Korea economically in the year ahead. The question of sanctions relief is of course important, as is the question of how directly and rigorously China will enforce the sanctions currently on the books. But what is missing throughout is what the recent visit will mean for the border areas, specifically Dandong. This essay finds that Kim Jong-un’s stopover and meeting with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials in Dandong was not extensive, nor did it result in a breakthrough in some bureaucratic logjams on that part of the border. At the same time, China is maintaining readiness for more economic activity with North Korea in the zone, and Kim’s trip was preceded by some long-awaited connectivity between Dandong and Sinuiju city officials.

Frustrating the Americans | Sometimes North Korea has the ability to surprise with its relative transparency, and this was one of those occasions. With a few promising exceptions let loose on the first day of the visit, Chinese state media kept a fairly short leash on its commentary and reporting on the Kim Jong-un visit.

The Sejong Institute’s Lee Seong-hyon speculated that the drop-off in public news about the second day of Kim’s visit might have been calculated warfare’ meant to drive American analysts to frustration. While it makes for a juicy, speculative headline that accords with anxieties over US-China relations, Lee’s analysis was still not quite as juicy or speculative as that of his Sejong counterpart Cheong Seong-chang, who told the South China Morning Post in a paraphrased comment, It cannot be ruled out that Kim and Xi will discuss shipping the North’s intercontinental ballistic missile out of the country to dismantle them, an issue that the US wanted to address.

Perhaps. But leaving speculation aside and revealing far more than the CCP media did, the North Koreans themselves released 45 minutes of video footage on the evening of January 10. Starved for specificity and finding the official Beijing readout of the visits (whether in English or Chinese) to be less than satisfying, some observers surely saw the broadcast as a late Christmas gift for those who just wanted to know such things as if Kim had stopped in Dandong during his journey (he did), if Kim Ki-nam was back on the scene (he was not) and if Hwang Pyong-so would be near the end of Kim’s reception queue and grovelling (he was both).

Kim Jong-un is sent on his way to Beijing via Sinuiju and Dandong by Kim Yong-nam, head of North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly, one of the early scenes in the North Korean documentary on the visit, broadcast on January 10. | Image: stimmekoreas YouTube channel

The big takeaway from the footage, without a doubt, was the Dandong stop-over on the way up and back. But all we really got from that city in terms of Western media reports was that some people had been asked to leave their hotel rooms so as not to spy Kim’s train.

More important is what Kim actually did in Dandong. With whom did he actually meet, and what might have they discussed?

In Dandong, Kim met with a CCP delegation headed by International Liasion Department head Song Tao. That’s no surprise: Song Tao is one of Kim’s longer-known interlocutors. But Kim also greeted Ge Haiying, the Party Secretary for Dandong municipality, and an important person if designated special economic zones at Hwanggumpyeong and Wihwa Islands are ever going to get off the ground again.

Present there was Chen Qiufa, the CCP Party Secretary for Liaoning, as well as Lu Dongfu, the somewhat floppy-haired head of China’s railways corporation. Kim had met a variation on this delegation back in March 2018 during a previous trip through Dandong, and it seems from the footage that the meetings took place on Kim’s train, primarily making it a meet-and-greet rather than a time to hash out details on broader coordination across the border.

Screen grab from North Korea’s documentary film on Kim’s January 2019 visit to China, with annotations by Adam Cathcart. | Image: stimmekoreas YouTube channel

A Kim Incoming | On January 11, the North Korean party paper Rodong Sinmun provided a very convenient readout of the inbound meeting in Dandong:

The train carrying the Supreme Leader arrived in Dandong, border city of China, at 9.30 p.m. Beijing time on Jan. 7.

Seen at Dandong Railway Station to greet Kim Jong Un were Song Tao, head of the International Liaison Department of the C.C., CPC, Chen Qiufa, secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Party Committee, Lu Dongfu, general manager of the China Railway Corporation, Li Jinjun, Chinese ambassador to the DPRK, and Ge Haiying, secretary of the Dandong City Party Committee.

Kim Jong Un got off the train together with his wife Ri Sol Ju and exchanged warm greetings with the leading officials of the Chinese side. Song Tao offered the greeting of the heartfelt and warm welcome to Kim Jong Un upon authorization of General Secretary Xi Jinping and the Central Committee of the CPC. Kim Jong Un and Ri Sol Ju were presented with bunches of flowers by women.

Kim Jong Un had an amicable talk with Song Tao on the train. He expressed thanks to Song Tao for coming all the way to the border town, warmly welcoming him and according hospitality with sincerity, while guiding him to Beijing every time.

Saying that attaching great importance and significance to Kim Jong Un’s current visit to China at the special and vital time, Xi Jinping and the party and government of China made exceptional instructions to render good reception, Song Tao added that he would do his best for the satisfactory success of the meeting between the top leaders of the two parties and the two countries.

Kim then took an overnight train to Beijing, arriving at 10:55 a.m. Funnily, PRC ambassador Li Jinjun had clearly taken a fast train from Dandong and was again at the Beijing station to meet Kim Jong-un along with Song Tao and Lu Dongfu a somewhat quirky reminder to the North Korean leader that he is travelling at the speed of the prior century, if in his own comfort, while Chinese officials and citizens are moving much, much faster.

None of this namely, the stopover in Dandong or the short meeting there was covered in mainland Chinese print media. This might have been for security reasons, but it might also have been to keep public expectations for development of the Sinuiju-Dandong corridor appropriately low.

As with the March 2018 visit, Ge Haiying was on the Supreme Leader’s train primarily to shake hands with Kim Jong-un. No formal meetings appear to have been held with the North Korean delegation. But did Ge Haiying and his new mayoral counterpart, Zhang Shuping, perhaps have meetings with North Koreans the next day, so as to pair up with the Xi-Kim meeting and demonstrate that the provinces were moving quickly to implement a closer economic relationship with North Korea? Of course they didn’t.

Ge Haiying instead chaired a meeting on 8 January which focused on implementing the spirit of Xi Jinping’s inspection of the province in late September 2018, and in which trade with North Korea, judging by the summary of the speech, would have very little to do with the economic revitalization of Liaoning or Dandong.

On January 9, Secretary Ge went up to Kuandian, a rural county also bordering North Korea, and gave a speech mainly dealing with poverty alleviation. Again, no references at all to the North Korean side, and no possible SEZ inference. Liaoning Party Secretary (essentially the governor, top job in the province) Chen Qiufa was at a follow-up meeting in Fengcheng, stating that economic work in the year ahead will be difficult. Chen’s remarks then ranged into a whole range of economic tasks for which North Korea would certainly be helpful (i.e., enlarging the economy) but none of which expressly dealt with foreign trade, cross-border trade, or the Belt and Road framework.

On the same day, Dandong’s new mayor Zhang Shuping went to a gathering of a subgroup of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference which included representatives from the worlds of industry and commerce. There she did what sounds like a fair amount of listening, and pledged to use of all my energy to open up and solve the blockage points, painful points, and difficult points which hinder development (of Dandong. Which is about as close as she got to mentioning the DPRK, whose Supreme Leader she had apparently not been invited to meet. However, if Kim had in fact mentioned future projects dealing with Dandong, this would have been a venue in which Zhang could convey that informally.

But in sum, through the first two days of the Kim visit, there was nothing released or even implied from the Dandong or Liaoning governments that would give any notion that the Kim meetings in Dandong had resulted in anything resembling a breakthrough, let along a continuation of ongoing projects, in any of the following areas: SEZ cooperation, tourism, cross-border movement, cross-border infrastructure.

Liaoning officials largely went about their normal business in the days after meeting with Kim Jong-un.

For the time being, cross-border or cross-provincial cooperation with North Korea along the Yalu and Tumen rivers seems destined to be small in scale and entirely reversible. Take for instance the ceremony held in the early morning hours of New Years’ Day in Hunchun city’s Fangchuan district, where a new day tour to the small North Korean town of Dumangang was inaugurated.

Of course it is worth noting that this project is primarily about getting Chinese in to North Korea, not North Koreans into China. Russian travellers are large in number for Hunchun, and the city is working on increasing its capacity to process foreign travellers. However, coming back to Dandong, there was nothing akin to this Dagongbao piece published after Kim Jong-un made his big play for Sinuiju urban renewal in November 2018, explicitly calling attention to the connectivity between the two cities and economies, potentially.

In terms of ignoring the reality of Dandong (unconsummated economic ties with Sinuiju) for more amorphous puffery about Kim Jong-un’s focus on economic growth at home and, by implication, the need for Chinese support in that endeavor, Xinhua’s longest analysis of the visit really said it all. The piece was of course headlined with and illustrated by Kim Jong-un’s visit to a Chinese medicine factory in Beijing. Further still, the story was positively loaded with such exciting tidbits as how many times Kim Jong-un said the word economic or economy in his speech (an 81% increase from his previous New Years’ Speech), noting that his on-site inspections were becoming increasingly oriented toward economic development.

The same authoritative CCP version of the visit made explicit what was already obvious, doing so by invoking a familiar voicing: South Korean media reported that Kim Jong-un’s train stopped at the Dandong train station. In other words, no Chinese reporting could be done on this aspect of the visit.

This is not to say that Kim’s visit back in Dandong was entirely fruitless, or that Dandong’s top CCP officials simply went back to business as usual after his journey. As Kim Jong-un was slowly making his way back to Pyongyang, where he finally arrived at 3 p.m. on January 10, the new mayor of Dandong, Zhang Shuping, had what would be the last word. She held forth at a meeting of the Dandong Frontier Economic Cooperation Zone (somewhat confusingly, now called short for Dandong bianjiang jingji hezuoqu ), around Xinchengqu. In other words, she was talking to people whose responsibilities include the area around the new and still-unused Yalu River Bridge, overlooking the disused North Korean island of Hwanggumpyeong that was to have served as a centerpiece of joint economic development with the DPRK.

Her remarks included the following:

The Frontier Cooperation Economic Zone is an important driver for Dandong’s development and revitalization. We must have a long-range stance, establish and develop confidence, gather momentum for development, abandon the psychology of being content to extend sovereignty over only part of the country (a saying from the Qing dynasty in reference to Southern Song general Yue Fei that in this case probably means that cadre should keep the greater good in mind and not be timid in telling individual bureaucrats that they cannot maintaining their own small kingdoms of influence), enhance the consciousness of development and opening up, focus on core business, and build the border area as a pilot area. [We should also] establish a new form of relationship between government and business [

The text that emerged from Zhang Shuping’s meeting with Dandong’s administrators dealing with border-region economic cooperation was hardly as explicit in its aims as we saw in Liaoning party press last fall in a provincial look at how to implement the One Belt, One Road framework. In contrast, Zhang’s reported remarks did not so much as mention the Hwanggumpyeong or Wihwa Island SEZs and their joint management with North Korea. This was not the stuff of a breakthrough, but of maintaining readiness. At the very least, it would send a signal to Kim Jong-un and North Korean counterparts that China is serious about the matter and remains ready to cooperate on cross-border trade and to move forward with the SEZ projects previously agreed upon.

Although the border SEZs in the Yalu Estuary were the subject of several meetings of a joint management committee from approximately 2010-2012, they have been moribund since Jang Song-taek’s purge and execution in 2013, and no amount of gesticulating, performative urban planning and travelling by Kim Jong-un has brought back a functional North Korean interest in the projects. Instead, in early 2019, China has thus far had to content itself with a few dozen tourists trekking into a new frontier for North Korean tourism on the other end of the frozen border, and with hailing Kim Jong-un’s first visit of 2019 as a triumph for China’s centrality in global politics.

There was, however, one final sign that things are in fact on a slow track at the local level, and that the long-needed cross-provincial contacts are finally going forward, although they apparently had very little to do with Kim’s trip.

A Sinuiju government delegation went to Dandong on 27 and 28 December to wish a happy new year, and it included some of the same officials who had been present at Kim Jong-un’s November 16 briefing on the new city plan. Both Ge Haiying and Zhang Shuping met with the head of that delegation, Ri Chong-ryol, the chair of Sinuiju Government People’s Committee.

While no mention was made whatever of economic cooperation, much less the joint committees for Hwanggumpyeong, the North Koreans surely got the message that Xi Jinping is driving the Liaoning government and cadre in Dandong to find ways to get the economy moving faster.

While the glow of international klieg lights may have been bright indeed in Beijing, in Dandong the reality of interacting with North Korea to implement remains difficult to predict. Will the detente on the peninsula lead North Korea to be more confident in its cooperative dealings with China as regards frontier development? As the Dandong city government reminds us in a profile of Zhang Shuping, 70% of all North Korean exports go through Dandong.

A final shot from the documentary of Kim Jong-un’s China journey lingers: The cameraman leaned out of the train window, panning upwards at the Chinese inscription above the Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge. Behind it, Sinuiju looked as dark as ever, but there may be more blueprinting going on in that murk than we are able to see.

Suppression of Opposition

After Kim assumed supreme leadership of North Korea, he reportedly executed or removed many senior officials that he had inherited from his father’s regime. Among those purged was his own uncle, Jang Song-thaek (also known as Chang Swho is believed to have played an important role during Kim Kim Jong-il’s rule and had been considered one of Kim Jong-un’s top advisers.

In December 2013, Jang was reportedly arrested and executed for being a traitor and plotting to overthrow the government. It is also believed that members of Jang’s family were executed as part of the purge.

In February 2017, Kim’s older half-brother Kim Jong-nam died in Malaysia. Although many details remained unclear, it was believed he was poisoned at Kuala Lumpur airport, and multiple suspects were arrested. Kim Jong-nam had been living in exile for many years, during which time he served as a vocal critic of his half-brother’s regime.

North Korea’s new Multiple Launch Rocket System: a closer look

On September 10, North Korea launched two projectiles, according to the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff. The launc.

On September 10, North Korea launched two projectiles, according to the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff. The launch event marked the tenth this year and came not long after vice foreign minister Choe Son Hui’s statement suggesting that talks could be held with the United States later this month. Early on September 11, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) released images of the test, s.

On September 10, North Korea launched two projectiles, according to the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff. The launch event marked the tenth this year and c.

Kim Jong-suk

Kim Jong-suk, mother of Kim Jong-il, is described as a revolutionary immortal and an anti-Japanese war hero [who] upheld the original > She is typified as a model revolutionary, wife, and maternal figure, and North Korean society looks to stories of her as examples of how to live life.

Although she was first lady of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the first year of its founding in 1948, she died in 1949, and starting in 1974, in conjunction with her son Kim Jong-il’s rise to position as the heir apparent, she was increasingly praised and her accomplishments memorialized throughout the nation. A museum and statue was built in her home town in her honor and she was called an indomitable Communist revolutionary by Kim Sung-ae who was Kim Il-sung’s then present wife, despite being largely ignored until this point. Thus, originally she was honored as a guerrilla, but not necessarily as a mother or wife. In the 1990s, Kim Jong-suk’s portrait was even added to those of Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il, which were displayed in every household and building and treated as sacred objects of veneration and worship. Furthermore, when referring to the three Great Generals of Paekdu Mountain, a sacred dormant volcano on North Korea’s northern border with China, North Koreans understand this to mean Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Suk, and their son Kim Jong Il.

Lexical aspects

We have also regarded the analysis of vocabulary as something very relevant, as about naming and wording deciding what to call something can constitute a claim about it’ (Johnstone, 2002, p. 46) In this regard, we will consider referencing and metaphors. In other words, we will focus in the way each participant refers to the other. It is usual to find implicit referencing to North Korea in Trump’s discourse and many times this is done using metaphors, which are well-known to the public such as the famous and fury’ (NBC News, 2017). In the selected texts, we can find that Trump talks about authoritarian regimes as scourge of our planet’ (Trump, 2017) without mentioning directly North Korea. However, he mentions it a line below as a way of example. This strategy appears in Johnstone’s book Discourse Analysis under the name of presupposition, where the public is information implicitly and leaving it to the hearer to deduce meaning and make assumptions’ (Johnstone, 2002, p.43). The same strategy is used the same text: the righteous many do not confront the wicked few, then evil will triumph’. In this case, he refers to these regimes (and, ultimately, North Korea) as wicked but, more importantly, he is implicitly referring with the word righteous not only to himself, as taking into account that this speech is pronounced at the United Nations, this serves as an appeal to engage for the rest of countries.

Lastly, in his speech for the State of the Union of 2018, several references are made through metaphors which are related to the idea of North Korea being a nation deprived from freedom. We can see that in the final part, where Trump tells the story of a North Korean defector, is a metaphor itself. This is becomes clear in the final sentence he states saying that Seong-ho’s tale is a to the yearning of every human soul to live in freedom’.

Regarding North Korea, Kim Jong-Un’s use of metaphors is also quite relevant. In the response speech (The New York Times, 2017), a constant metaphor exists in which the North Korean leader associates Trump with an animal, specifically, a dog. We can see that in the idiomatic sentence frightened dog barks louder’. This implicit reference becomes explicit at the end of the speech, (will surely and definitely tame the mentally deranged U.S. dotard with fire’), through the use of the verb to tame which, according to the Oxford Dictionary online, means less powerful and easier to control’ but also domesticate (an animal)’. He also uses the expression fire’, retaking Trump’s statement (and fury’), which could be considered as a response. Also in this speech, we can see that, while he refers to himself as man representing the DPRK , appealing to the Democratic in Popular Korean Republic’ he calls Trump the man holding the prerogative of the supreme command in the US’, appealing to the fact that he is the sole person holding the power.

In terms of projection of power, metaphors are an essential part of political discourse as they can the addressee’s perspective on the referent or topic that is the target of the metaphor, by making the addressee look at it from a different conceptual domain or space’ (Steen, 2008, p.22) and important means of conceptualizing political issues and constructing world views’ (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 48). In this case, we can state that they are a resource to engrain in public opinion a certain association so the audience can identify an idea with a concept belonging to their reality, which Simpson and Mayr refer to as target domain and source domain respectively (2010, p.43).

Familism in the personality cult

Familism is a type of collectivism in which the one is expected to prioritize the needs of the greater society or family over the needs of the individual. This plays out on a large scale in North Korea, where the Great Leader Kim Il-Sung is Father and the Worker’s Party is Mother. Thus, not only are the people expected to cherish their birth parents and treat them with all the respect demanded of traditional Confucian filial piety, but they must cherish and adore the ruling Kim family and the Mother Party even more so.

Familism in North Korea stems from a combination of the traditional East Asian Confucian value of filial piety, the communist system of collectivism, and the Kim cult of personality. As a traditional East Asian and Confucian value, the importance of family has come to resonate through all aspects of North Korean life, from politics to the economy to education and even to interpersonal relationships between friends and enemies.

When the Soviet Union first entered North Korea in 1945 to start its occupation, it had to start almost from scratch in establishing a communist base in the capital region of Pyongyang. In fact, the Soviets’ ideologies of communism and socialism were likely as foreign to the Koreans of Pyongyang as the Soviets themselves. However, by emphasizing family and a father-child relationship between the Soviet Union and Korea, and later between Kim Il-Sung and the North Korean people, Kim not only managed to apply Western Marxism to an Asian state, but also to secure his own personality cult, thereby constructing a sense of unquestioning loyalty toward him amongst the North Korean people when North Korea was at its most vulnerable to unwelcome western influences.

However, in the late 1960s after the establishment of Juche as official North Korean >[citation needed]

The cults of personality also promote the > There was particular stress on the Confucian filial love of the son for his parents. After their deaths Kim dedicated monuments to his father and mother, respectively.

However, biographer Dae-Sook Suh doubts the sincerity of Kim’s displays of reverence of his parents. In cons > By simply publicly portraying himself being a loyal boy who liked his parents, Kim positioned himself to demand a similar filial dedication from his subjects.

Similarly, in celebration of his father’s 60th birthday, Betty Jong-Il created three plays for him, [quotation needed] built 3 monuments, which include North Korea’s Arch of Triumph, for his 70th birthday more than 20 years ago, and upon Kim Il-Sung’s fatality in year 1994, Kim Jong-Il declared 3 years of mourning before totally claiming leadership of North Korea.

How cyberattacks will be generating enormous amounts in illicit revenue for North Korea

A new United Nations Security Authorities report means out just how North Korea utilized cyberattacks to generate as much as $2.

A fresh United Nations Security Council report spells out how North Korea applied cyberattacks to create as much as $2 billion altogether proceeds as of yet in order to fund its guns programs. This kind of amount is significant for 2 reasons. Initially, it eclipses previous estimations, emphasizing the prominence of cyber methods in North Korea’s illicit revenue-earning toolkit. A 2018 estimate simply by cybe.

A new United Nations Protection Council record spells away how North Korea employed cyberattacks to create as much as $2 billion as a whole proceeds to date in ord.

Meetings with U. S i9000. President Trump

On 06 12, 2018, Kim and Trump shook hands on the secluded Capella resort in Singapore, before heading off pertaining to private discussions with their interpreters. Their meeting, the initial between a part of the Betty ruling as well as sitting U. S. president, came simply weeks following the latest rounded of hooligan rhetoric insecure to torpedo the effort.

After top staffers joined these people for extended talks, the two market leaders signed a joint declaration in which Overcome committed to provide security guarantees to North Korea and Kim reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean language Peninsula. inches The declaration was brief on specifics, though the two men stated that negotiations would resume quickly.

We a new historic appointment and decided to leave earlier times behind, inch said Betty at the placing your signature to ceremony, observing that the world sees a major change.

Irrespective of Kim’s indicated commitments to the peace method, North Korean language factories extended to produce fissile material used in the creation of nuclear weapons. In late JulyThe Washington Postreported that the routine was probably building new liquid-fueled global ballistic missiles.

Kim and Trump fulfilled for a second time, with the Metropole motel in Hanoi, Vietnam, in February twenty seven, 2019. The leaders distributed friendly words, with Trump noting the country’s superb economic potential and Ellie praising his counterpart’s courageous decision to interact in reveals.

However , the two sides suddenly finished their particular talks around the second day, reportedly more than American refusal of North Korea’s present to dismantle its primary nuclear facilitybut not their entire weaponry program in exchange intended for the end of all sanctions. Overcome said that the meeting concluded on good terms, irrespective, and that Ellie had agreed to continue staying away from indivisible and airborne missile checks.

Kim and Trump met up for a third time in June 30, 2019, their very own engagement at the DMZ tagging the first time a sitting U. S. leader had entered North Korea. Following their show of solidarity, it was announced that the two factors had designated negotiators for resumed discussion posts.

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